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Ever since the McKinley Tariff Act received the
assent of the President, suggestions have been from time
to time made that its reciprocity clause was unconstitutional in that it delegated legislative power to the Executive Department of the Government.
If the act does in fact make such a delegation, the
objection is a serious one. Mr. Locke said long ago, "The
legislature neither must, nor can, transfer the power of
making laws to anybody else, or place it anywhere but
where the people have."' This maxim of political science
applies with special force to the Government of the United
States, whose Constitution vests "all legislative powers" in
the Congress, subject only to the limited veto of the
President.
The McKinley Tariff Act, as approved October i,
i89o,2 places "sugars, molasses, coffee, tea, and hides, raw
and uncured," upon the free list.
Civil Government, s. 142.

226 Statutes at Large, 567.
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The third section of the act is as follows:
" That with a view to secure reciprocal trade with

countries producing the following articles, and for this
purpose, on and 'after the first day of January, eighteen
hundred and ninety-two, whenever and so often as the
President shall be satisfied that the government of any
country producing and exporting sugars molasses, coffee,
tea, and hides, raw and uncured, or any of such articles,
imposes duties or other exactions upon the agricultural or
other products of the United States, which, in view of the
free introduction of such sugar, molasses, coffee, tea, and
hides into the United. States he may deem to be reciprocally unequal and unreasonable, he shall have the power
and it shall be his duty to suspend, by proclamation to that
effect, the provisions of this act relating to the free introduction of such sugar, molasses, coffee, tea, and hides, the
production of such country, for such time as he shall deem
just, and in such case and during such suspension duties
shall be levied, collected and paid upon sugar, molasses,
coffee, tea, and hides, the product of or exported from such
designated country as follows, namely."
Then follows a list of duties to be imposed upon the
'designated articles if the President shall have suspended by
proclamation under the third section the provision as to
the free introduction of such articles.
The act therefore (I) admits free of duty certain specified subjects of commerce, (2) unless any foreign country
exporting such articles to the United States shall impose
duties upon the agricultural or other products of the
United States reciprocally unequal and unreasonable, (3)
the evidence of such imposition of such reciprocally unequal and unreasonable duties being a finding of that fact
by the President of the United States, and then (4) the free
importation of such articles into the United States shall be
suspended, and during such suspension they can only be
imported subject to the duties specified in the third section
of the act.
The constitutionality of the reciprocity clause can be
supported upon three distinct lines of argument.
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I.
In Stuart z,. Laird,' the Court said with regard to the

right of judges of the Supreme Court .to sit as Circuit
Judges, that "practice and acquiescence for a period of
several years, commencing with the organization of the
judicial system, afford an irresistible answer, and have
indeed fixed the construction. It is a contemporary interpretation of the most forcible nature. This practical exposition is too strong and obstinate to be shaken or controlled."
Inl Briscoe z. The Bank of Kentucky, 2 Mr. Justice
M'-AEAx,

in considering the question of the power of a

State to charter a bank with power to issue circulating
notes, said, "An uniform course of action involving the
right to the exercise of an important power by the State
goverinents for half a century, and this almost without
question, is no unsatisfactory evidence that the power is
rightfully exercised."
In Martin v.Hunter's Lessee,' wherein the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States as
exercisable under the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary
Act with teference to final judgments and decrees of State
courts of last resort was sustained, Mr. Justice STORY
said : "Itis an historical fact, that this exposition of the
Constitution, extending its app'ellate power to State
Courts, was previous to it-; adoption, unifornly and
publicly avowed by it. friends, and admitted by its
enemies, as the basis of their rez-pective reasonings, both
in and out of the State conve.ationu.
It is an historical
fact, that at the time -%lien the Judiciary- Act was submitted to the deliberations of the first Congress, composed.
as it was, not only of men of great learning and ability,
but of men who had acted a principal part in framing,
supporting, or opposing that Constitution, the same exposition was explicitly declared and admitted by the friends
and by the opponents of that system. It is an historical
fact, that the Supreme Court of the U-nited States have.
'I iCranch, 97.
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from time to time, sustained this appellate jurisdiction in
" a great variety of cases, brought from the tribunals of
many of the most important States in the Union, and that
no State tribunal has ever breathed a judicial doubt on the
subject, or declined to obey the mandate of the Supreme
C6urt, until the present occasion. This weight of contemporaneous exposition by all parties, this acquiescence
of enlightened State Courts, and these judicial decisions of
the Supreme Court through so long a period, do, as we
think,_place the doctrine upon a foundation of authority
which cannot be shaken, without delivering over the subject to perpetual and irremediable doubts."
In Cohens v. Virginia,' wherein the doctrine of the
preceding case was ap'plied in a criminal prosecution of
one of its citizens by a State, Chief Justice MARSHALL said,
"Great weight has always been attached, and very rightly
attached, to contemporaneous exposition ;" and he adds,'
referring to the Judiciary Act, ." We know that in the Congress which passed that act were many eminent members
of the convention which framed the Constitution. Not a
single individual, so far as is known, supposed that part of
the act which gives the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over the judgments of the State Courts in the case
therein specified to be unauthorized by the Constitution...
This concurrence of statesmen, of legislators, and of judges
in tfhe same construction of the Constitution may justly
inspire some confidence in that construction."
In Cooper v. Ferguson,' wherein the question was as
to the construction of a statute of the State of Colorado,
Mr. Justice WooDs said, "The act was passed by the first
legislature that assembled after the adoption of the Constitution, and has been allowed to remain upon the statute
book to the present time. It must, therefore, be considered as a contemporary interpretation, entitled to much
weight."
These authorities, so clearly recognizing the force of a
contemporaneous exposition, and a subsequent legislative
and judicial acquiescence as affecting and as determining
I Wheaton,

418.

2

Page 40o.
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the construction of the Constitution, are applicable to this
question.
Some of the legislative precedents are these:
Section 4219 of the Revised Statutes imposed a tonnage duty of two dollars and thirty cents per ton on foreign
vessels entered in the United States from any foreign port
to and with which vessels of the United States are not
ordifiarily permitted to trade, on other vessels thirty cents
per ton; "provided that the President of the'United States
shall be satisfied that the discriminating or countervailing
duties of any foreign nation to which such vessels belong, so
far as they operate to the disadvantage of the United States,
have been abolished;' then eighty cents per ton."
Section 4228 of the Revised Statutes provides that the
President may issue his proclamation declaring that the
discriminating duties of tonnage and imposts are suspended
upon satisfactory proof to him that no discriminating
duties of tonnage or imposts are imposed or levied in the
ports of any nation upon vessels, produce, manufactures
of, or merchandise imported from, the United States. 2
The Act of i March, 1817, c. 31,' forbids the importation of goods in foreign bottoms, under penalty of forfeiture, but section 2498 provides that "the preceding section shall not apply to vessels or goods, wares or merchandise imported in vessels of a foreign nation which does not
maintain a similar regulation against vessels of the United
States," and a forfeiture under this statute was sustained
in the case of The Merritt, 17 Wallace, 582.

The Act of 6 March, 1866, c. 12, s. r,' forbids the importation of neat cattle and the hides of neat cattle from
any foreign country, and power is given to either the Presdent of the 'United States, or the Secretary of the Treasury, to suspend the operation of the prohibition.
The proviso of this section is a re-enactment of the Act of 31 May.
1S30, C. 219; 4 Statutes, 425.
2 This section is a re-enactment of the Act of 24 Ma,
Is2S;
4 Statutes, 3oS.
:'3 Statutes, 351 ; Revised Statutes, s. 2497.
4 14 Statutes, 3; Revised Statutes, s. 2493-
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The Act of Congress of 9 July, 1846,' provided for
the submission to the qualified voters of the county of
Alexandria:, in the District of Columbia, of the question of
retrocession to the State of Virginia, created the machinery
of election, and declared that, if a majority of the voters
should refuse, the act should be void, and, if a majority of
the voters should be in favor of accepting its provisions,
it should be in full force, and that the President should
then inform the Governor of Virginia of the result of the
election, etc., and the retrocession should be accomplished.
Under the provisions of the act the election was held, the
provisions of the act accepted by the voters, the retroces-.
sion made, and no objection was ever suggested as to the
constitutionality of the statute.
The TariffAct of 2 March, 1861,2 imposed certain duties

upon fish andfish oil. The Act of iMarch, 1873, c. 213," provided that whenever the President of the United States
shall receive satisfactory evidence that Great Britain and
Canada have passed laws to give full effect to the provisions
of the treaty of Washington signed on 8 May, 1871, he is
authorized to issue his proclamation declaring that he has
such evidence, and thereupon certain fish oils and fish shall
be admitted free of duty from Canada.
It would be easy to add largely to these citations
from the statutes, but those which have been cited are sufficient to show that the reciprocity clause of the McKinley
Tariff Act is abundantly supported by legislative precedents, whose constitutionality has not been questioned.
II.

The question is also concluded by direct judicial decision.
In the case of Aurora, 7 Cranch, 382, the facts were,
that the Act of I March, 18o9, forbade importations into the
United States from Great Britain or France, or their colo1 9 Statutes, 35.
2 Revised

Statutes, s. 2504, Schedule F.
17 Statutes, 482; Revised Statutes, s. 25o6.
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nies, but the act provided that the President "be, and he
hereby is authorized, in case either France or Great Britain
shall so revoke or modify her edicts as that they shall cease
to violate the neutral commerce of the United States, to
declare the same by proclamation, after which the trade
suspended by this act . . . may be renewed, etc. On 19
April, 18o9, the President issued his proclamation declaring

that Great Britain had so revoked, but that proclamation
was subsequently withdrawn. On i May, i8io, Congress
passes an act, the fourth section of which declared "that
in case either Great Britain or France should before 3
March, i8ii, so revoke, etc., which fact the President shall
declare by proclamation, and if the other nation shall not
revoke within three months thereafter, then the Act of
i March, 18o9, shall be revived, etc."

On 2 November,

i8io, the President issued his proclamation declaring that
France had so revoked. An Act of 2 March, i811, provided that until the President declared by proclamation
that Great Britain revoked, the Act of i March, i8o9, should
be in force as regards importations from that country. The
Aurora, clearing from Liverpool on iiDecember, i8io,
sailed on the 16th, and arrived at New Orleans on 2 February, 1811. Her cargo was libelled, and was liable to
forfeiture, if the President's proclamation of 2 November,
i8io, had in law the force of reviving the Act of I March,
18o9. It was argued that "the legislature did not transfer
any power of legislation to the President. They only prescribed the evidence which should be admitted as to the
fact upon which the law should go into effect." This
view was sustained by the Court, Mr. Justice JOHNSON
saying, page 388, "There is no sufficient reason why the
legislature should not exercise its discretion in reviving
the Act of i March, i8o9, either expressly or conditionally,
as their judgment should direct."
It is difficult to distinguish between the case of "The
Aurora" and the question under consideration, and if the
reciprocity clause of the McKinley Tariff Act is to be held
to be a delegation of legislative power to the Executive
Department, and therefore unconstitutional, the case of the
Aurora must be overruled.
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Those who contend that the clause in question is unconstitutional rely upon those well-known cases, of which
Parker v. The Commonwealth (6 Pa., 507); Rice v. Foster
(4 Harrington, 479); and Barto '. Himrod (4 Selden, 483),
are illustrations, and which hold that a legislature cannot
delegate to the people of a State, or of a municipal subdivision of a State, the power of determining whether or
not an act of the legislature, as, for instance, an act
authorizing the granting of licenses for the sale of liquor,
shall be operative in the State, or within any particular
political subdivision of the State.
The ground of decision in those cases is, that the delegation of legislative power by the people to the legislature,
and to the legislature only, vests exclusively in the legislature the right, and imposes exclusively upon the legislature the duty, of determining not only (I) what the terms
of a law shall be, but also (2) whether or not the law shall
become operative; and that to permit the people of a whole
State, or of a part of a State, to determine whether the
law shall become operative is as much a delegation of legislative power as it is to permit them to determine what
tle terms of the law shall be.
It is obvious that this principle, even if conceded to
its fullest extent, has no 'elevancy to the question under
discussion, for, as has been shown, there is not to be found
in the McKinley Tariff Act a delegation to the Executive
Department of power either to make the law, or to determine, in the exercise of the will of the Executive, whether
or not the law shall go into effect, and the delegation, giving it its fullest effect, is only of the ministerial and essentially executive power of finding that fact, upon whose
finding the law, as formulated by the legislative will, is to
take effect.
But the authority of the anti-local-option cases has
been shaken, and some of them have been expressly overruled, by Locke's Appeal (72 Pa., 491); State v. Parker (26
Vt., 357); Smith v. Janesville (26 Wis., 291), and many
other cases.
The Chief Justice of the United States has said, in
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Rabrer's case (i4o U. S., 561), that " the principle upon
which local option laws so called have been sustained is,
that while the legislature cannot delegate its power to
make a law, it can* make a law which leaves it to a
municipality or the people to determine some fact or state
of things upon which the action of the law may depend."
That dictum, so forcibly and so clearly stated, enunciates the principle, which is conclusive of the question
under consideration.
III.
If the question were not concluded by legislative and
judicial precedents, and if it were fairly open for argument upon principle, it would not present any serious
difficulty.
Mr. Austin' has pointed out that the line distinguishing executive and legislative powers cannot in any government be drawn with absolute accuracy; and he adds, "that
the legislative sovereign powers and the executive sovereign
powers belong in any society to distinct parties is a supposition too palpably false to endure a moment's examination."
Especially is this true in the Government of the United States.
whose Constitution, while declaring that "the executive
power shall be vested in a President," nowhere attempts to
define that power. No possible act of legislation is in itself
complete and effective until it be administered by the judiciary department, or by the Executive Department, and
sometimes by both. Forinstance, a statute may declare murder to be a crime punishable with death, and may define the
crime tobe the unlawful and premeditated killing of a human
being, but that statute cannot be carried into effect until the
crime has been committed, and until the judicial department has determined that the individual charged with the
commission of the crime did kill a human being, and did
kill that human being, unlawfully and with premeditated
intent; or, in other words, before the legislative will, as exI "The Province of Jurisprudence Determinated,"

207.
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pressed in that statute, can be carried info effect, a fact, or
a series of facts, must be found by the judicial department.
How does that differ in principle from that finding by
the Executive Department which is essential to carry into
effect the legislative will, -as expressed in the reciprocity
clause of the McKinley Tariff Act?
Again, the Constitution has in express terms authorized Congress "to provide for calling forth the militia to
execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections and
repel invasions;" but Congress, in its exercise of that
constitutional authority, was so jealous of executive usurpation of the power of the sword that, by the Act of February 28, 1795,' it empowered the President to employ the

army and navy in the suppression of insurrections within
any State only "on application of the legislature of such
State, or of the Executive, when the legislature cannot be
convened. '
"
It is obvious that that act could not be carried into
effect unless the President found as a fact, (i) that the
legislature of a State had made an application within the
terms of the act, or (2) that the legislature of a State
could not be convened, and, (3) that that being so, the Executive of that State had made an application within the
terms of the act. Wherein does that differ in principle
from the question under consideration?
To sum up the whole matter, it can be to the fullest
extent conceded that the Constitution forbids the legislative
department of the Government to delegate to the Executive,
or to any one, that power of legislation which has been
vested exclusively in Congress, subject only to the qualified
veto of the President; but it cannot be conceded that the
clause under consideration does, in fact, delegate legislative power to any one. The analysis printed sura, page
66, shows that that which Congress has done has been to
declare that certain designated subjects of commerce shall
be admitted free of duty, or subject to a rate of duty specified in the act, as the President may or may not find a particular fact, viz., the imposition of reciprocally unequal
i Statute, 424; Revised Statutes, s. 5297.

